Game Theory and Information Economics (2023 fall)
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Textbook: our class is mainly based on Game Theory for Applied Economists /A Primer in Game Theory, by Robert Gibbons.
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Some Textbooks for reference
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Games of Strategy, Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath, and David Reiley
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GAMES AND INFORMATION: An Introduction to Game Theory, by Eric Rasmusen
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An Introduction to Game Theory, by Martin J. Osborne
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Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice, by Prajit K. Dutta
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Applied Game Theory and Strategic Behavior, By Ilhan K. Geckil and Patrick L. Anderson
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Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory, by Joel Watson
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If you have strong desire on game theory, the following books are good reference
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Game Theory, by Drew Fudenberg, and Jean Tirole
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Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict Reprint Edition, by Roger B. Myerson
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Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. (This is the classic work from which modern-day game theory is started.)
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A Course in Game Theory, Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein
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Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, by George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson
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Class Syllabus
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Class slides
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Class I static game with complete information
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Class II dynamic game with complete information
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Class III repeated game
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Class IV static game with incomplete information
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Class V dynamic game with incomplete information
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Assignmengs and Tests
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Assignment 1
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Class materials for previous years
assignments of 2022 fall semester
Assignment #1 answer to assignment #1
Assignment #2 answer to assignment #2
Assignment #3 answer to assignment #3
Assignment #4 answer to assignment #4
assignment #1: textbook 1.2,1.4,1.6, 1.10, due date: 22, September, answer to assignment 1
assignment #2 answer to assignment #2
midterm exam and answer (2020 fall)
midterm exam and answer (2021 fall)
assignment #3: textbook 3.2,3.3,3.4,3.5, due date: 2021/11/17. answer to assignment 3
assignment #4, due date 2021/12/03, answer to assignment 4.
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Job Market Signaling model
- Supplementary Reading material
- Equilibrium points in n-person games, PNAS, J.Nash, 1950
- Agreeing to Disagree, The Annals of Statistics. 4 (6): 1236–1239, Robert Aumann
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Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Ariel Rubinstein, Econometrica, 1982
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Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, D. Diamond and P. Dybvig, Journal of Political Economy,1983
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Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, E. Lazear and S.Rosen, Journal of Political Economy, 1981
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The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information, Drew Fudenberg, Eric Maskin Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 3. (May, 1986)
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Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games, Jean-Pierre Benoît and Vijay Krishna, Econometrica , Mar., 1993, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Mar., 1993)
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Finitely Repeated Games, Jean-Pierre Benoit and Vijay Krishna, Econometrica , Jul., 1985, Vol. 53, No. 4 , pp. 905-922
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Shapiro, Carl, and Stiglitz, Joseph E. “Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device” [J] American Economic Review 74 (1984): 433-44.
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Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Kalyan Chatterjee and William Samuelson, Operations Research , 1983, Vol. 31, pp. 835-851
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Bargaining with Private Information, John Kennan and Robert Wilson, Journal of Economic Literature , 1993, Vol. 31, pp. 45-104
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Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, Myerson and Satterthwaite, Journal of Economic Theoy,1983, Vol. 29, 265-28
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Job Market Signaling, Michael Spence, The Quarterly Journal of Economics , 1973, Vol. 87, No. 3. pp. 355-374
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On Forward Induction, Srihari Govindan and Robert Wilson, Econometrica , Jan., 2009, Vol. 77
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On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria, Elon Kohlberg and Jean-Francois Mertens, Econometrica , 1986, Vol. 54, pp. 1003-1037
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Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, DAVID M. KREPS, PAUL MILGROM, JOHN ROBERTS AND ROBERT WILSON, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 27, 245-252 (1982)
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Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria, In-Koo Cho and David M. Kreps,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1987, Vol. 102, pp. 179-222
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Strategic Information Transmission,Vincent P. Crawford and Joel Sobel,Econometrica , 1982, Vol. 50, pp. 1431-1451
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Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in Signaling Games, Cho, I., and Sobel, J., Sobel, Journal of Economic Theory, 1990, Vol., 50, 381-413
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Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data, Cramton, P., and Tracy, J., American Economic Review, 1992, Vol. 82, 100-121
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Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Points, John C. Harsanyi, International Journal of Game Theory, 1973, Vol., 2, pages1–23
Advanced Microeconomics (2022, Shanghai Academy of Social Science)
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Textbook: Microeconomic Theory, Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, Jerry
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Class Syllabus
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Assignments
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Exams
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Class Materials
Intermediate Microeconomics (2022 spring, SHUFE)
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Textbook Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach, Eighth Edition, Hal R. Varian
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Lecture notes
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Assignments
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Exams
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final test (0772, 0819,0558) answer to final test
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- Exercises and tests of previous years (2021 spring)
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Midterm Test (2021 spring) , Answers to midterm
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Further reading material
Reading List on Social Network (reading group for phd student, Fall, 2020)
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Ballester, C., Calvó-Armengol, A. and Y. Zenou (2006), "Who's who in networks. Wanted: the key player", Econometrica 74, 1403-1417, PDF
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Ushchev, P., and Y. Zenou (2020), "Social Norms in Networks". Journal of Economic Theory 185, 104969,PDF.
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Golub, B., Andrea Galeotti and Sanjeev Goyal, Targeting Interventions in Networks, Econometrica, Forthcoming,PDF
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Jadbabaiea Ali, Kakhbodb Ali, Optimal contracting in networks, Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, Vol. 183, 1094–1153, PDF
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FAINMESSER, I., and GALEOTTI, A., Pricing Network Effects, The Review of Economic Studies , January 2016, Vol. 83, pp. 165-198, PDF
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Benjamin Golub and Matt Elliott (2019), A Network Approach to Public Goods, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 127, PDF
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Golub,B., Jackson, M.,(2012), How Homophily Affects the Speed of Learning and Best-Response Dynamics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 127,PDF
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Benjamin Golub, Elliott, M., and Jackson, M., (2014), Financial Networks and Contagion, American Economic Review, Vol.104,PDF
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Ballester, C., Calvo-Armengol, A., and Zenou, Y., (2010), Delinquent networks, Journal of the European Economic Association,Vol. 8, 34-61, PDF
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Calvó-Armengol, A., Patacchini, E. and Y. Zenou (2009), Peer effects and social networks in education, Review of Economic Studies 76, 1239-1267. PDF
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Acemoglu, D., and Jackson, M.(2015), History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms, The Review of Economic Studies , Vol. 82, PDF
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Jackson, M., O., and Brian W. Rogers. 2007. Meeting Strangers and Friends of Friends: How Random Are Social Networks? American Economic Review, 97 (3): 890-915, PDF
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Bramoullé, Y., Kranton, R., and d’Amours, M., (2014), Strategic Interaction and Networks, American Economic Review, 104 (3): 898-930,PDF
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Campbell, A.,(2013), Word-of-Mouth Communication and Percolation in Social Networks, The American Economic Review, Vol. 103, pp. 2466-2498, PDF
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Jackson, M., and Wolinsky, A., (1996), A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, Journal of Economic Theory Volume 71, Pages 44-74, PDF
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Gagnon, J., Goyal, S., Networks, Markets, and Inequality, The American Economic Review, 2017, Vol. 107,PDF
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Arieli, I., Babichenko, Y., Peretz, R., Young, H.,(2020), The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks, Econometrica,PDF
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Sanjeev Goyal, Venkatesh Bala (2003), A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation, 2000, Econometrica,PDF
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Elliot Lipnowski, Sadler, E., (2019), Peer-Confirming Equilibrium, Econometrica,PDF
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Acemoglu, D., , Carvalho, V., , Ozdaglar,A., , Tahbaz-Salehi, A.(2012), The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations, Econometrica,PDF
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Elchanan Mossel, Manuel Mueller-Frank, Allan Sly, Omer Tamuz(2020) , Social Learning Equilibria, Econometrica,PDF
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Renaud Bourlès & Yann Bramoullé, 2017. Altruism in Networks, Econometrica,PDF
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Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Konrad Mierendorff (2013), Generalized Reduced‐Form Auctions: A Network-Flow Approach, Econometrica, Volume 81,PDF
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Fajgelbaum, P., Schaal,E., (2020) Optimal Transport Networks in Spatial Equilibrium, Econometrica, Vol. 88, 1411-1452,PDF
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Acemoglu, Daron and Azar, Pablo, Endogenous Production Networks (2020), Econometrica, Vol. 88, pp. 33-82,PDF
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Susanne M. Schennach, Long Memory via Networking (2018), Econometrica, Vol. 86,PDF
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Tamás Fleiner, Ravi, Jagadeesan, Zsuzsanna Jankó, Alexander Teytelboym (2019), Trading Networks With Frictions, Econometrica, Vol. 87,PDF
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Sergio Currarini, Jackson,M., Paolo Pin (2009), An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation, Econometrica, Vol. 77, PDF
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Elchanan Mossel, Allan Sly, Omer Tamuz, STRATEGIC LEARNING AND THE TOPOLOGY OF SOCIAL NETWORKS, Econometrica, Vol. 83, pp. 1755-1794, PDF
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Ryota Iijima, Yuichiro Kamada (2017), Social distance and network structures, Theoretical Economics, Vol. 12, 655–689, PDF
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Calvó-Armengol, Antoni and Matthew O. Jackson. 2004. "The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality." American Economic Review, 94(3):426-454. PDF
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Social Capital and Social Quilts: Network Patterns of Favor Exchange (Xu Tan, Matthew O. Jackson and Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer) American Economic Review, 2012, volume 102, issue 5, pp 1857-97. PDF
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König, M., Tessone, C. and Y. Zenou (2014), "Nestedness in networks: A theoretical model and some applications ", Theoretical Economics 9, 695-752. PDF
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Ballester, C., Calvó-Armengol, A. and Y. Zenou (2010), "Delinquent networks", Journal of the European Economic Association, 8, 34-61. PDF.
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Consumption risk-sharing in social networks, Attila Ambrus, Markus Mobius and Adam Szeidl, American Economic Review,104, 149-182 (2014). PDF
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Attack, Defence, and Contagion in Networks, SANJEEV GOYAL and ADRIEN VIGIER, The Review of Economic Studies , October 2014, Vol. 81, No. 4 (289) ,PDF
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Dziubinski, M., Goyal, S. and Minarsch, D. E. N. The Strategy of Conquest, Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming (2020), PDF
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Dziubiński, M., Goyal, S., Individual security, contagion, and network design. Journal of Economic Theory, 170, p. 182-226, 2017 3. PDF
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Dziubiński, M., Goyal, S., How Do You Defend A Network? Theoretical Economics, 12(1), p. 331-376, 2017, PDF
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Locally Bayesian Learning in Networks, (Xu Tan and Wei Li), Theoretical Economics, 2020, volume 15, pp 238-278. PDF
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Learning Dynamics in Social Networks, Simon Board and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Econometrica, Vol. 89, No. 6 (November, 2021), 2601–2635, PDF
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Review Papers
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"An Overview of Social Networks and Economic Applications," in the The Handbook of Social Economics, edited by J. Benhabib, A. Bisin, and M.O. Jackson, North Holland Press 2011. PDF
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"Games on Networks'' with Yves Zenou, in the: Handbook of Game Theory Vol. 4, edited by Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, Elsevier Science, 2014. PDF
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"The Economic Consequences of Social Network Structure'' with Brian Rogers and Yves Zenou, in the Journal of Economic Literature 55:1, 49-95, doi: 10.1257/jel.20150694, 2017. PDF
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"Networks: An Economic Perspective'' with Brian Rogers and Yves Zenou, forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of Social Network Analysis, and arXiv 1608.07901.PDF
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"The Past and Future of Network Analysis in Economics'', in the The Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Networks 2016. PDF
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"Network Formation,'' in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law , MacMillan Press, 2008. PDF
Recent Development in collusion-proof mechanism design
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Andreas, Asseyer, Collusion and delegation under information control, Theoretical Economics, 2020,PDF
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Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement, Sylvain Chassang and Juan Ortner, Journal of Political Economy, 2019, PDF
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Crime, Intimidation, and Whistleblowing: A Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports, Sylvain Chassang, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Review of Economic Studies, 2018,PDF
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Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure, Sylvain Chassang and Juan Ortner, Journal of Political Economy, 2018,PDF
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Consulting Collusive Experts, Dilip Mookherjee, Alberto Motta and Masatoshi Tsumagari, Games and Economic Behavior, forchcoming, PDF
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Colinvon Negenborn and Martin Pollrich, Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations, 2020, Journal of Economic Theory, PDF
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Alfredo Burlando and Alberto Motta Collusion and the Organization of the Firm, AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS, 2015, PDF
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David Rahman, But Who Will Monitor the Monitor? The American Economic Review, 2012, 102, 2767-2797, PDF
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Martin Pollrich, "Mediated Audits" RAND Journal of Economics 2017, Vol 48(1), pp. 44-68, PDF
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Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information, Fahad Khalil, Jacques Lawarrée, Troy J. ScottThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2015,PDF
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Khalil, Fahad, Jacques Lawarrée, and Sungho Yun. "Bribery versus Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of Two Evils." The RAND Journal of Economics 41.1 (2010): 179-98. PDF
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DAVID A. MILLER, Robust Collusion with Private Information, The Review of Economic Studies , 2012, PDF
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Gregory Pavlov, 2008, Auction design in the presence of collusion, Theoretical Economics, PDF
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Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions Yeon-Koo Che, Daniele Condorelli, Jinwoo Kim, Journal of Economic Theory 178 (2018) 398–435, PDF
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Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information, Fahad Khalil, Jacques Lawarrée, Troy J. Scott, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Winter 2015), pp. 872-890,PDF
Mechanism Design Theory (July, 20, 2020)
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Lecture note
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Class videos: https://pan.baidu.com/s/11BdxGnzDwJlOlRsUvlTl4g 提取码:jzsj
Intermediate Microeconomics (2020 spring, SHUFE)
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Textbook Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach, Eighth Edition, Hal R. Varian
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Class videos: 链接: https://pan.baidu.com/s/1G6xtf6nKm4BE8xRAZWXq3g?pwd=qhi8 提取码: qhi8
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Homework
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Exercises
Advanced Microeconomics (2018, Shanghai Academy of Social Science)
Contract Theory (2014, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics)
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Textbook Contract Theory By Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont
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Lecture notes