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Game Theory and Information Economics (2023 ​fall)

assignments of 2022 fall semester

Assignment #1        answer to assignment #1

Assignment #2        answer to assignment #2

Assignment #3        answer to assignment #3

Assignment #4        answer to assignment #4

assignment #1: textbook 1.2,1.4,1.6, 1.10, due date: 22, September​, answer to assignment 1 

assignment #2   answer to assignment #2​

midterm exam and answer (2020 fall)  

midterm exam and answer (2021 fall)

​assignment #3: textbook 3.2,3.3,3.4,3.5, due date: 2021/11/17. answer to assignment 3

assignment #4, due date 2021/12/03, answer to assignment 4.

Advanced Microeconomics (2022, Shanghai Academy of Social Science)

Reading List on Social Network  (reading group for phd student, Fall, 2020)

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  • Ballester, C., Calvó-Armengol, A. and Y. Zenou (2006), "Who's who in networks. Wanted: the key player", Econometrica 74, 1403-1417, PDF

  • Ushchev, P., and Y. Zenou (2020), "Social Norms in Networks". Journal of Economic Theory 185, 104969,PDF.

  • Golub, B.Andrea Galeotti and Sanjeev Goyal, Targeting Interventions in Networks, Econometrica, Forthcoming,PDF

  • Jadbabaiea Ali, Kakhbodb Ali, Optimal contracting in networks, Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, Vol. 183, 1094–1153, PDF

  • FAINMESSER, I., and  GALEOTTI, A., Pricing Network Effects, The Review of Economic Studies , January 2016, Vol. 83,  pp. 165-198, PDF 

  • Benjamin Golub and Matt Elliott (2019), A Network Approach to Public Goods, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 127, PDF

  • Golub,B., Jackson, M.,(2012), How Homophily Affects the Speed of Learning and Best-Response Dynamics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 127,PDF

  •  Benjamin Golub, Elliott, M.,  and Jackson, M., (2014), Financial Networks and Contagion, American Economic Review, Vol.104,PDF

  • Ballester, C., Calvo-Armengol, A., and Zenou, Y., (2010), Delinquent networks, Journal of the European Economic Association,Vol. 8, 34-61, PDF

  • Calvó-Armengol, A., Patacchini, E. and Y. Zenou (2009),   Peer effects and social networks in education, Review of Economic Studies 76, 1239-1267. PDF

  • Acemoglu, D., and Jackson, M.(2015),  History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms, The Review of Economic Studies , Vol. 82, PDF

  •  Jackson, M., O., and Brian W. Rogers. 2007. Meeting Strangers and Friends of Friends: How Random Are Social Networks?  American Economic Review, 97 (3): 890-915, PDF

  • Bramoullé, Y., Kranton, R., and d’Amours, M., (2014), Strategic Interaction and Networks, American Economic Review, 104 (3): 898-930,PDF

  • Campbell, A.,(2013), Word-of-Mouth Communication and Percolation in Social Networks, The American Economic Review, Vol. 103, pp. 2466-2498, PDF

  • Jackson, M., and Wolinsky, A., (1996), A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, Journal of Economic Theory Volume 71, Pages 44-74, PDF

  • Gagnon, J., Goyal, S., Networks, Markets, and Inequality, The American Economic Review, 2017, Vol. 107,PDF

  • Arieli, I., Babichenko, Y., Peretz, R., Young, H.,(2020), The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks, Econometrica,PDF

  •  Sanjeev Goyal, Venkatesh Bala (2003),  A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation, 2000, Econometrica,PDF

  •  Elliot Lipnowski, Sadler, E., (2019), Peer-Confirming Equilibrium, Econometrica,PDF

  • Acemoglu, D., ,  Carvalho, V., , Ozdaglar,A., , Tahbaz-Salehi, A.(2012), The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations, Econometrica,PDF

  •  Elchanan Mossel, Manuel Mueller-Frank, Allan Sly, Omer Tamuz(2020) , Social Learning Equilibria, Econometrica,PDF

  • Renaud Bourlès & Yann Bramoullé, 2017. Altruism in Networks,  Econometrica,PDF

  • Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Konrad Mierendorff (2013), Generalized Reduced‐Form Auctions: A Network-Flow Approach, Econometrica, Volume 81,PDF

  •  Fajgelbaum, P.Schaal,E., (2020) Optimal Transport Networks in Spatial Equilibrium, Econometrica, Vol. 88, 1411-1452,PDF

  • Acemoglu, Daron and Azar, Pablo, Endogenous Production Networks (2020), Econometrica, Vol. 88, pp. 33-82,PDF

  • Susanne M. Schennach, Long Memory via Networking (2018), Econometrica, Vol. 86,PDF

  • Tamás Fleiner, Ravi, Jagadeesan, Zsuzsanna Jankó, Alexander Teytelboym (2019), Trading Networks With Frictions, Econometrica, Vol. 87,PDF

  • Sergio Currarini, Jackson,M., Paolo Pin (2009),  An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation,  Econometrica, Vol. 77, PDF

  • Elchanan MosselAllan SlyOmer Tamuz, STRATEGIC LEARNING AND THE TOPOLOGY OF SOCIAL NETWORKS, Econometrica, Vol. 83, pp. 1755-1794, PDF

  • Ryota Iijima, Yuichiro Kamada (2017),  Social distance and network structures, Theoretical Economics, Vol. 12, 655–689, PDF

  • Calvó-Armengol, Antoni and Matthew O. Jackson. 2004. "The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality." American Economic Review, 94(3):426-454. PDF

  • Social Capital and Social Quilts: Network Patterns of Favor Exchange  (Xu Tan,  Matthew O. Jackson and Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer) American Economic Review, 2012, volume 102, issue 5, pp 1857-97. PDF

  • König, M., Tessone, C. and Y. Zenou (2014), "Nestedness in networks: A theoretical model and some applications ", Theoretical Economics 9, 695-752. PDF

  • Ballester, C., Calvó-Armengol, A. and Y. Zenou (2010),   "Delinquent networks", Journal of the European Economic Association, 8, 34-61. PDF.

  • Consumption risk-sharing in social networks, Attila Ambrus, Markus Mobius and  Adam Szeidl, American Economic Review,104, 149-182  (2014). PDF

  • Attack, Defence, and Contagion in Networks, SANJEEV GOYAL and ADRIEN VIGIER, The Review of Economic Studies , October 2014, Vol. 81, No. 4 (289) ,PDF 

  • Dziubinski, M., Goyal, S. and Minarsch, D. E. N. The Strategy of Conquest, Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming (2020), PDF

  • Dziubiński, M., Goyal, S., Individual security, contagion, and network design. Journal of Economic Theory, 170, p. 182-226, 2017 3. PDF

  • Dziubiński, M., Goyal, S., How Do You Defend A Network? Theoretical Economics, 12(1), p. 331-376, 2017, PDF

  • Locally Bayesian Learning in Networks, (Xu Tan and Wei Li), Theoretical Economics, 2020, volume 15, pp 238-278. PDF

  • Learning Dynamics in Social Networks, Simon Board and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Econometrica, Vol. 89, No. 6 (November, 2021), 2601–2635, PDF

Review Papers

  • "An Overview of Social Networks and Economic Applications," in the The Handbook of Social Economics, edited by J. Benhabib, A. Bisin, and M.O. Jackson, North Holland Press  2011. PDF

  • "Games on Networks'' with Yves Zenou, in the: Handbook of Game Theory Vol. 4, edited by Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, Elsevier Science, 2014. PDF

  • "The Economic Consequences of Social Network Structure'' with Brian Rogers and Yves Zenou, in the Journal of Economic Literature 55:1, 49-95, doi: 10.1257/jel.20150694, 2017. PDF

  • "Networks: An Economic Perspective'' with Brian Rogers and Yves Zenou, forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of Social Network Analysis, and arXiv 1608.07901.PDF

  • "The Past and Future of Network Analysis in Economics'', in the The Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Networks 2016. PDF

  • "Network Formation,'' in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law , MacMillan Press, 2008. PDF

                    Recent Development in collusion-proof mechanism design

 

  • Andreas, Asseyer, Collusion and delegation under information control, Theoretical Economics, 2020,PDF

  • Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement, Sylvain Chassang and Juan Ortner, Journal of Political Economy, 2019, PDF

  • Crime, Intimidation, and Whistleblowing: A Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports, Sylvain Chassang, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Review of Economic Studies, 2018,PDF

  • Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure, Sylvain Chassang and Juan Ortner, Journal of Political Economy, 2018,PDF

  • Consulting Collusive Experts, Dilip Mookherjee, Alberto Motta and Masatoshi Tsumagari, Games and Economic Behavior, forchcoming, PDF

  • Colinvon Negenborn  and Martin Pollrich, Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations,   2020, Journal of Economic Theory, PDF

  • Alfredo Burlando and Alberto Motta Collusion and the Organization of the Firm,  AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS, 2015, PDF

  • David Rahman, But Who Will Monitor the Monitor? The American Economic Review, 2012, 102, 2767-2797, PDF

  • Martin Pollrich, "Mediated Audits" RAND Journal of Economics 2017, Vol 48(1), pp. 44-68, PDF

  • Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information, Fahad KhalilJacques Lawarrée, Troy J. ScottThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2015,PDF

  • Khalil, Fahad, Jacques Lawarrée, and Sungho Yun. "Bribery versus Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of Two Evils." The RAND Journal of Economics 41.1 (2010): 179-98. PDF

  • DAVID A. MILLER, Robust Collusion with Private Information, The Review of Economic Studies , 2012, PDF

  • Gregory Pavlov, 2008, Auction design in the presence of collusion, Theoretical Economics, PDF

  • Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions   Yeon-Koo Che,  Daniele Condorelli, Jinwoo Kim, Journal of Economic Theory 178 (2018) 398–435, PDF

  • Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information, Fahad Khalil, Jacques Lawarrée, Troy J. Scott, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Winter 2015), pp. 872-890,PDF

Mechanism Design Theory (July, 20, 2020)​​

Advanced Microeconomics (2018, Shanghai Academy of Social Science)

Contract Theory (2014, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics)

Advanced International Trade (2010, East China Normal University)

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